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Abstract
This essay argues that the widespread but not widely recognised adaptation of Frankenstein in
contemporary dance music problematises the ‘technological’ constitution of modern copyright law
as an instrument wielded by corporations to exert increasing control over cultural production.
The argument first surveys recent accounts of intellectual property law’s responses to sound
recording technologies, then historicises the modern discourse of technology, which subtends such
responses, as a fetish of industrial capitalism conditioned by Frankenstein. The increasing
ubiquity of cinematic Frankenstein adaptations in the latter two decades of the twentieth century
outlines the popular cultural milieu in which Detroit techno developed its futuristic aesthetic, and
which provided subsequent dance music producers with samples that contributed to techno’s
popularisation. These cultural and economic contexts intersect in an exemplary case study: the
copyright infringement dispute in 1999 and 2000 between Detroit’s Underground Resistance
(UR) techno label and the transnational majors Sony and BMG.
Introduction
When London, Ontario’s DJ Capital J (a.k.a. Jason Bunsie) began performing regularly
at Toronto parties in the late 1990s, his sets included a self-produced dub plate that
became a floor-filling anthem for Toronto’s junglist massive. The plate grafts the
triumphal first bar of John Williams’ Star Wars theme to a jump-up bass hook and a
self-promotional vocal loop: ‘Right right set now / My my my my my man / On on on
the decks – Capital J!’ (Capital J [n.d.], Untitled). The track extends hardcore techno’s
tradition of sampling as a cheaper alternative to instrumental performance, a tradition
whose roots Simon Reynolds identifies in ‘early hip hop’, for which ‘sampling was
like Frankenstein’s monster, funk-limbs crudely bolted together’ (Reynolds 1998,
p. 45). The resulting bombast of J’s track echoes that of proto-jungle hardcore acts like
The Prodigy, whose 1992 single ‘Out of Space’ popularised hardcore’s ready-made
sampling tradition by splicing Max Romeo’s ‘Chase the Devil’ with the Ultramagnetic
MCs’ ‘Critical Beatdown’.1
Capital J’s track appropriates three notable referential functions of the sample
for his own performance practice. Firstly, this sample cites a colonial war story that
pits rebels against an evil empire: is this a message to the majors? In the films’
soundtracks, the notes sampled by J often herald combat scenes where the rebels
start kicking imperial ass. Thematising military conflict, the sample thus engages
the rhetoric of rivalry and ‘clashes’ that jungle derives, like hip hop, from ‘sound’
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culture (Gilroy 1987, p. 166). Secondly, Capital J’s unlicensed use of the sample
exemplifies the critique of corporate copyright theorised by Porcello (1991) and
Schumacher (1995), and thus re-territorialises one theme of his source text. For Star
Wars is an unsettling family romance, motivated by ambitious presumption (the title
of the first stage Frankenstein [Levine and Knoepflmacher 1979, p. xx]), and
grounded in technologies of clones, cyborgs, and planet-destroying weaponry.2 So,
like most other Hollywood science fiction today, Star Wars adapts the story of Mary
Shelley’s Frankenstein. Thus, Capital J’s unlicensed sampling of Williams’ score
represents a secondary adaptation, through successive regimens of recording tech-
nology: studio production, improvised turntablist performance, mix tape distri-
bution, and online upload. Lastly, Capital J’s adoption of the Star Wars theme to
announce his performance echoes the similar use of the same track by Detroit
radio DJ Electrifyin’ Mojo (a.k.a. Charles Johnson) in opening the ‘Midnight Funk
Association’ show that influenced the innovators of Detroit techno (Eshun 1998,
p. 101). Capital J’s performance thus plays out the mechanisation of music-making
labour ‘as an alien power’ (Baldick 1987, p. 132) that subverts the copyright protec-
tion of sound recordings while re-inscribing the ‘author function’ (Foucault 1984,
p. 108) through DJ performance.
This anecdote encapsulates the present study’s argument: that the widespread
but not widely recognised adaptation of Frankenstein in contemporary dance music
problematises the ‘technological’ constitution of modern copyright law as an instru-
ment wielded by corporations to exert increasing control over cultural production. In
making this argument I draw on Mark Slobin’s theoretical distinctions among sub-,
inter-, and super-cultural production (Slobin 1996, pp. 100–1): ‘Super- suggests an
overarching category, sub- an embedded unit, and inter- a crosscutting trend’ (ibid.,
p. 12). Slobin’s deliberately sketchy use of ‘subculture’ in theorising music production
outlines it as a ‘small-scale network’ (ibid., p. 35); ‘supercultural’ production refers to
the nexus of industry and state (ibid., pp. 29–30) as embodied in Hollywood and
major record labels that produce hegemony through financial, government, and
media institutions; and ‘intercultural’ production can denote ethnic and diasporic
articulations (e.g. Paul Gilroy’s ‘Black Atlantic’ [1993]), or those between sub- and
super-cultural practices.
This argument requires the elaboration of three related contexts. First, I survey
some recent scholarly accounts of intellectual property law’s responses to sound
recording technologies, especially those of sampling and file-sharing. Then I histori-
cise the modern discourse of technology, which subtends such responses, as a fetish of
industrial capitalism shadowed by the ‘modern myth’ of Frankenstein (Baldick 1987,
p. 1). The ascendant ubiquity of cinematic Frankenstein adaptations during an emerg-
ing post-industrial ‘regime of flexible accumulation’ (Latham 2002, p. 17) outlines the
popular cultural milieu in which Detroit techno developed its particular variant of
‘Black Atlantic Futurism’ (Eshun 1998, p. -005), and which provided subsequent
dance music producers with samples that contributed to techno’s popularisation.
These contexts intersect in the exemplary case study of a copyright infringement
dispute in 1999 and 2000, between Detroit’s Underground Resistance (UR) techno
label and the transnational majors Sony and BMG. According to UR, Sony pressed and
began distributing an unlicensed cover of the Detroit label’s popular ‘Jaguar’ track.
That Sony and BMG merged in late 2004, leaving some eighty per cent of the global
music market under the management of four companies (‘Indies challenge’ 2004),
underscores the issues discussed here.
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The propriety of art in the age of mechanical reproduction
The transnational oligopoly of these four companies owes its privilege in part to the
responses of intellectual property laws to sound recording innovations in the early
twentieth century. As David Laing writes, the dominance of the record industry over
popular music production in the latter twentieth century depends on the ‘ownership
of copyright in sound recordings by record companies rather than by musicians’:
That grant of ownership was one of two important innovations created in the United States
copyright legislation of 1909. This law was drawn up, in part, to take account of new tech-
nologies that had changed the configuration of cultural production in the previous one or two
decades. Probably the most important of these were the cinematograph and the various means
of mechanical reproduction of musical works, notably the phonograph [. . .] the resulting
legislation provided the early record labels with a legal status comparable to that of the (then)
all-powerful music publishers. (Laing 2002, pp. 185–6)
Laing notes this legislation’s crucial attribution of authorship to corporations, not
musicians (ibid., p. 185), and the irony that legislation introduced to curb the music
publishers’ ‘dangerous monopoly’ has virtually instituted one for the record industry
(ibid., p. 186). He then contrasts the industry-dominated patenting and marketing of
successive ‘recording technologies and consumer electronics products’ (e.g. digital
audiotape, CD) with ‘a new kind of distributor’ represented by online file-sharing
(ibid., p. 193), noting the record companies’ ‘hostil[ity] to this first generation of music
hardware technology not controlled by the music industry’ (ibid., p. 192).
Like Laing, Steve Jones (2002) and Peter Grant and Chris Wood (2004) suggest
that the record industry is poised to reassert its dominance in the online domain,
through its formidable advantages in marketing, capital, and law. These critics,
among others, analyse modern copyright property law as an instrument for arrogat-
ing the control of cultural production to major corporations, amidst the globalising
markets of ‘blockbusters and trade wars’ (Grant and Wood 2004, pp. 3–4). Grant and
Wood’s discussion of the ‘curious economics’ of popular culture identifies copyright
law as a monopolising tool in itself (ibid., p. 49), enabling, for a given work, arbitrary
‘price discrimination between markets’ (ibid., p. 54):
copyright law [. . .] maximises that effect [i.e. price discrimination] by abetting the subdivision
of markets into temporal windows and territories of exploitation. The game then is to play out
a property across as many windows and territories as possible, extracting maximum return
from each. (ibid., p. 85)
To explain why only ‘big’ players – i.e. transnational, diversified corporations –
usually succeed, they add that ‘to do this, it is helpful if you happen to own or control
a significant number of windows or territories’ (ibid., p. 85). Territories must be
understood here not only as geographically distinct markets, but also as distinct
consumer media ‘formats’; Laing notes that Sony’s patent on compact-disc tech-
nology combines with its music division copyright properties to consolidate its
‘vertical integration’ (ibid., p. 193).
The rhetoric of ‘revolution’ that marks so much marketing of consumer tech-
nology can be attributed in part to Marshall McLuhan’s theory of the Gutenberg
revolution, in which the early modern advent of printing technology transformed the
medieval ontology mediated by manuscripts. As David McKitterick suggests, the
figure of revolution, in which new media compete with old, may be less historically
accurate than that of mutual accommodation and benefit (quoted in Saunders 2005,
p. F3). However, the more arresting figure of revolution dominates the bourgeois
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social imaginary, driven in part by modernity’s distinctive ambivalence toward
technological innovation. This ambivalence – which inflects the modern usage of
‘technology’ itself, through the popular mediations of Shelley’s Frankenstein – marks
the reception and representation of successive and competing sound recording
technologies of both production (e.g. samplers) and consumption (e.g. file sharing).
Thomas Porcello’s study of sampling ethics dramatises the anxieties over
labour redundancy and musical authenticity with which many audio engineers
viewed digital sampler technology in the 1980s. His interview subjects, professional
audio engineers, frequently figure sampling as ‘dehumanising’: When one inter-
viewee ‘speaks of how samplers ‘‘dehumanise’’ music, he is commenting not only
on effective qualities in the musical product, but [also . . .] the production process
itself in which machines are physically replacing humans’ (Porcello 1991, p. 82).
Porcello repeatedly cites one interviewee’s comparison of out-of-work musicians to
laid-off Detroit auto workers (ibid., pp. 76, 78, 82) to illustrate music industry
perceptions of ‘interchangeable’ technicians (ibid., p. 80) and musicians as wage
labourers (ibid., p. 81).
Thomas Schumacher expands on Porcello’s closing reference to ‘oppositional’
sampler use in hip hop (ibid., p. 82) to theorise how sampling enables dialogic
possibilities for cultural production that counter music industry hegemony. Quoting
Bettig’s (1992) comment that ‘intellectual property rights continue to be utilised to
gain or maintain market advantages by an increasingly oligopolistic and multi-
national culture industry’, Schumacher supports it by observing that court decisions
in audio sampling cases consistently favour the copyright owners, ‘securing the rights
of the corporate legal subject over the concerns of cultural expression’ (Schumacher
1995, p. 266).
Jones (2002) describes the problems posed for the corporate exploitation of
copyright by new media’s short-circuits of distribution through an image of uncon-
trolled technology similar to Laing’s: ‘The industry [. . .] is in the process of using legal
means with which to establish new loci of exchange for the movement of digital goods
in which it owns rights’ (ibid., p. 223). Until or unless ‘the industry’ establishes such
loci, Jones speculates, its ‘ability to control a ‘‘mainstream’’ of music [. . .] will, at least
in the short term, be severely tested, as music moves across digital networks with, at
best, licensing providing the only revenue source to copyright holders’ (ibid.,
pp. 223–4).
The music industry’s campaign against file-sharing reproduces earlier historical
campaigns against not only samplers but also against phonographs and juke boxes,
which, as Sarah Thornton documents, were constructed as a similar threat to live
(read: authentic) musicianship (Thornton 1996, p. 34). In this long tradition, the major
labels’ current copyright campaign aligns itself with labour interests by appealing
to authorial originality as a principle of ‘making one’s living’, in opposition to a
technology figured as theft, as the privation of ‘honest’ labour.
Lee Marshall suggests that corporate recourse to legal and legislative means, like
blank media taxes and extensions of copyright protection periods, demonstrate
copyright law’s ‘economically irrational’ dependence on a Romantic ideology of
authorship that mystifies the major labels’ ruthless pursuit of profit (Marshall 2002,
p. 6). Schumacher describes this ‘irrational’ rationalisation as ‘one of the funda-
mental contradictions in legal theory: its reliance on the myth of the original, individ-
ual author coupled with the abandonment of the author-subject for the corporate
rights-holding-subject’ (Schumacher 1995, p. 270).
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Laing echoes Marshall’s reference to a Romantic ideology of authorship: ‘the
residual aura of authorship guarantees that this will be more highly rewarded than
the ‘‘industrial’’ connotations of recording’ (Laing 2002, p. 182). Laing’s summary of
copyright law’s stake in ‘utility’ (ibid., p. 179) evokes the Utilitarian philosophy of
Jeremy Bentham, criticism of whom often referred to Frankenstein (see Morton 2002,
pp. 85–8).
Frankenstein and the fetish of industry
Current intellectual property law in music production thus represents an ‘order of
discourse’ (Foucault 1981, p. 48) limiting the proliferation of cultural reproduc-
tion technologies. In the above-quoted critiques, ‘technology’ and ‘control’ become
crucially paired signifiers whose conjunction suggests how anxiety over technology
is integral to the modern meaning of the word. The centrality of technologically
motivated anxiety to copyright law itself depends on the fetish image that the term
technology has come to evoke, an image shaped early in the nineteenth century by
corresponding transformations in the meaning of ‘industry’, as traced by Raymond
Williams:
in the last decades of the eighteenth century, industry [. . .] became a collective word for our
manufacturing and productive institutions [. . .] Industry, with a capital letter, is thought of as
a thing in itself – an institution, a body of activities – rather than simply a human attribute.
(Williams 1958, p. 13)
Williams’ account of Industry’s reification as a ‘thing in itself’ contextualises the
related transformation in the term ‘technology’ during the Industrial Revolution.
During the Victorian period, technology traded in its earlier meanings as both the
‘study of an art or arts’ and ‘the terminology of a particular art or subject’ to assume its
modern meaning as a collective noun for the ‘practical’ or ‘industrial’ arts, their
processes and products (OED). While the OED’s first citation of the modern meaning
of ‘technology’ dates from 1859, David Nye (1994) notes that this modern meaning
was innovated by Harvard medical professor Jacob Bigelow in 1828, whose Elements
of Technology made the now familiar claim that ‘[t]he labour of a hundred artificers is
now performed by the operations of a single machine’ (quoted in Nye 1994, p. 45). Nye
suggests that ‘only gradually did ‘‘technology’’ acquire the all-encompassing sense it
commonly has today. In the middle of the nineteenth century, technical universities
began to call themselves institutes of technology, and the word began to take on the
connotation of utilitarianism (as distinct from ‘‘science’’)’ (ibid.).
But as Baldick argues, ‘technology’, as increasingly popular metonymy for
machinery, also began to assume monstrous connotations during the Victorian
period. ‘What I shall call the technological reduction sees the story [of Frankenstein]
chiefly as an uncanny prophecy of dangerous scientific inventions’ (Baldick 1987,
p. 7). Baldick describes the fetishistic connection between Frankenstein and technology
thus: ‘The technological interpretation of the myth resembles many influential
diagnoses of ‘‘the machine age’’ in that its isolation of the machine as the root evil of
modern civilisation merely reinforces the very fetishism of mechanical power which it
sets out to deplore’ (ibid., p. 8).
One of the most ‘influential diagnoses of ‘‘the machine age’’’ to which
Baldick refers is Thomas Carlyle’s 1829 essay ‘Signs of the times’, which criticised
Utilitarianism, identifying it with ‘mechanism’ as opposed to organic, human
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‘dynamism’. Describing his era as ‘a time of unmixed evil’ (Carlyle 1829, ¶6), as
‘the Age of Machinery’ (ibid., ¶9), Carlyle reserves his harshest condemnation of
‘the Genius of Mechanism’ (ibid., ¶12) for its permeation of the cultural and
religious domains of human life, a permeation achieved through various tech-
nologies of reproduction, specialisation and incorporation. ‘Literature, too, has its
Paternoster-row mechanism, its Trade-dinners, its editorial conclaves, and huge
subterranean, puffing bellows; so that books are not only printed, but, in a great
measure, written and sold, by machinery’ (ibid., ¶12). Carlyle’s equally vivid
characterisation of this technological literature’s content as ‘not a matin or vesper
hymn to the Spirit of Beauty, but a fierce clashing of cymbals, and shouting of
multitudes’ (ibid., ¶36) anticipates the Futurist ‘art of noise’ that several commentators
have canonised as techno’s avant-garde heritage (see Shapiro 2000, pp. 4–7).
Carlyle’s anxiety over the mechanisation of literature centres on changes in its
modes of reproduction, and thus prefigures the arguments against technological
change made by music industry representatives since the early twentieth century.
Similarly, his image of mechanised literature anticipates later receptions of dance
musics from jazz to disco that devalue them as synthetic, mechanical and inauthentic,
receptions critiqued by Tricia Rose (1995, p. 103), Susan McClary (1994, pp. 31–2), and
Walter Hughes (1994, p. 151). Adorno’s image of ‘jitterbugs’, whose ‘ecstasy [. . .] has
convulsive aspects reminiscent of St Vitus’s dance or the reflexes of mutilated
animals’ (Adorno 1991, p. 46), precisely echoes Carlyle’s ‘galvanic’ images of ‘modern
humanity as a disconnected and fragmented automaton’ (Baldick 1987, p. 103): ‘For
Carlyle galvanism is the appropriate image for the modern state of possession, in
which tremendous energies work themselves out only as undirected physical reflexes.
His galvanic world is a world of the living dead’ (ibid., p. 106). ‘Mechanism’ itself
becomes Adorno’s figure for the popular music industry of which the jazz fan is a
particularly ‘regressive’ symptom (Adorno 1991, pp. 46–8). However, in direct
opposition to Adorno and his elitist influence on popular music criticism, arguments
by Hughes, Rose, Kodwo Eshun, and Ben Williams (2001) suggest that the ‘tech-
nological reduction’ of dance music produces empowering forms of ‘technological
identification’ (Hughes 1994, p. 151): ‘Becoming robots was, for African American
musicians, a subliminally political act [. . .] a form of self-empowerment’ (Williams
2001, p. 161). Hughes figures this identification for queer disco scenes in clearly
Frankensteinian fashion: ‘The fearful paradox of the technological age, that machines
created as artificial slaves will somehow enslave and even mechanise human beings,
is ritually enacted at the discotheque’ (Hughes 1994, pp. 151–2).
As Nye notes, ‘ambivalence toward technology was more prevalent in England
than in the United States. [. . .] The English were prone to view industrialisation in
terms of satanic mills, frankensteinian monsters, and class strife’, whereas he charac-
terises the American attitude to technology as more receptive, inflected with positive
moral connotations (Nye 1994, p. 54). Early English responses to mechanical produc-
tion modes organised the modern distinction between culture and nature in industrial
terms, pitting ‘mechanism’ against ‘dynamism’, or technology against humanity, as
dramatised by Shelley’s ‘modern Prometheus’. Complicating Nye’s national distinc-
tions, Baldick finds Frankenstein references in US writers like Nathaniel Hawthorne
and Margaret Fuller (Baldick 1987, pp. 70–3) as readily as in British figures; and the
‘technological reduction’ of Frankenstein that begins avant la lettre with writers like
these continues with Marx himself (ibid., p. 132) and Victorian sensations like Bram
Stoker’s Dracula, whose technologies of cultural reproduction Mark Seltzer traces to
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theorise the modern ‘body-machine complex’ (Seltzer 1993, p. 102). Seltzer sketches
the contradictory problematic of technology in current criticism as both ‘an emptying
out of human agency’ and its ‘extension’: the ‘double logic of technology as prosthesis’
(ibid., p. 99). The abundance of trans-Atlantic adaptations of Shelley’s ‘modern myth’
has marked the current meaning of ‘technology’: as fetish, as reified labour, as the
machine in the ghost.
The filmic annihilation of the labour force known as man
As Baldick argues, the ‘modern myth’ of Frankenstein consists of the myriad ‘adapta-
tions, allusions, accretions, analogues, parodies, and plain misreadings which follow
upon Mary Shelley’s novel’ (Baldick 1987, p. 4). The proliferation of Frankenstein film
adaptations during the period in which Reagan and Thatcher began to implement the
labour-disorganising economic policies of post-industrial globalisation represents a
super-cultural symptom of this regime, and an important context for historicising
Detroit techno. The particular super-cultural texts discussed here should be familiar
to most readers (in brand power, if not in detail). As popular cultural products,
these texts fare poorly in the judgement of both academic science fiction specialists
(see Aldiss 1986, p. 73) and more canonically minded scholars. But it is precisely
the popularity of these ‘mainstream’ products that makes them available to
‘underground’ appropriations, and establishes their use for cultural studies.
Timothy Morton’s Literary Sourcebook on Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (Morton
2002) lists among its film adaptations (pp. 74–8) many of these widely sampled
movies: Blade Runner (1982), Videodrome (1983), The Terminator (1984), Robocop (1987),
Star Trek: The Next Generation (1987), and The Matrix (1999). Morton’s inclusions are
authoritative, and I refer the reader to them rather than explicate them here. But
Morton’s film omissions are considerable, and his musical omissions (ibid., p. 79) even
more so, given the adaptation practices mapped here; Blade Runner and Terminator
samples in particular abound in dance tracks (e.g. Love Child’s ‘Time travellers’,
Andora’s ‘Blade Runner’, and ‘Terminator II’ by Rufige Cru [a.k.a. Goldie]). Morton
applies a more selective or literal theory of adaptation than Baldick’s outline of
Frankenstein’s myth-generating ‘skeleton story’ – its premise of artificial intelligence
and its plot of a creator threatened with destruction by its creature (Baldick 1987, p. 3)
– an outline that establishes criteria for counting as Frankenstein adaptations not only
Star Wars (1977), but also Battlestar Galactica (1978) and Max Headroom (1987).
As mentioned above, Star Wars grounds its plot of anti-imperial insurrection
in the power-structuring technologies of cyborgs, cloning, and planet-destroying
weaponry. Moreover, Darth Vader’s effective transformation of his son Luke
Skywalker into a cyborg like himself reflects the doubling of Shelley’s characters.
Among the dance tracks sampling Star Wars are the aforementioned Capital J track,
Underground Resistance’s Death Star EP, and Sir Round’s ‘Imperial march’.
Battlestar Galactica (1978) bases its plot more obviously on Frankenstein, as an
army of cyborg human clones called ‘Cylons’, bent on ‘the final annihilation of the life
form known as man’, pursues a ‘rag-tag fugitive fleet’ of the galaxy’s remaining
humans.3 With special resonance for this study, the charges of copyright infringement
that Lucas’ empire brought against Larson’s Battlestar (Aldiss 1986, pp. 273–4) prefig-
ure the controversy in which Underground Resistance (UR) became embroiled with
Sony (although a dispute between two major players differs significantly from one
between a major and a minor). Battlestar found contemporary dance adaptation with
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Italian disco producer Giorgio Moroder, an acknowledged influence on the early
Detroit scene (Sicko 1999, p. 45), who released Music from ‘Battlestar Galactica’ and
other original compositions. Subsequent dance adaptations have been issued by Kenny
‘Dope’ Gonzalez, Acen, and the Cylon drum and bass label.
Moroder’s album covered the disco song ‘It’s love, love, love’, which provided
the soundtrack to a nightclub scene in the Battlestar pilot, according to the now-
formulaic mise-en-scène whereby science fiction films adopt the subcultural sounds of
the present to conjure a futuristic world. Similarly, techno and New Wave sound-
tracked Max Headroom, a self-reflexive experiment in cyberpunk television, whose
talking-head protagonist delivers McLuhanesque satire to the haves and have-nots of
a post-apocalyptic metropolis under transnational corporate rule. The local media’s
inability to control its ‘star reporter’s’ artificially intelligent alter ego, and the sinister
yet booming business of the Body Banks are two of the overtly Frankensteinian
aspects of this franchise, which also leased its title character to the sampler-based band
Art of Noise for the 1986 single ‘Paranoimia’.
Afro-futurism in Dr. Funkenstein’s ‘Techno City’
In this milieu, techno ‘was recognisably related to the presiding utopian – and
dystopian – prophecies of its time: Alvin Toffler’s book The Third Wave (published in
1980), Ridley Scott’s movie Blade Runner (released in 1982), William Gibson’s novel
Neuromancer (published in 1984)’ (Williams 2001, pp. 154–5). Like Dan Sicko’s popular
history, Techno Rebels (1999), Ben Williams contextualises the origins of Detroit techno
and the work of later producers like UR according to ‘the new global space of
postindustrial capitalism’ (ibid., p. 155). And like Ken McLeod in a recent issue of this
journal (McLeod 2003), Williams locates Detroit techno in the ‘Afro-futurist’ tradition
theorised by Eshun (1998), Mark Dery (1993), John Corbett (1994), Julian Jonker (2002),
and Erik Davis (2004).
The omission of Williams’ work from McLeod’s survey of space and alien tropes
in popular music (McLeod 2003) represents only one problem with the latter article.
More serious are signs of McLeod’s unfamiliarity with the scenes he surveys: he
misspells the names of Cybotron’s collaborators (ibid., p. 344); he rehearses common,
celebratory clichés about ‘rave’; and he simply misreads ‘ragga’ in claiming that the
‘polyrhythmic drum and bass lines’ of jungle are ‘influenced by Indian ragas’ (ibid.,
p. 344). For our purposes, McLeod’s deferral of the capitalist problematic represents
this article’s main methodological problem. Eschewing the Marxist theory of aliena-
tion in favour of a use of the term ‘alienation’ in its more existential sense, McLeod
makes the sweeping claim that ‘rock’s fascination with science fiction themes [. . .] is
dependent upon a sense of God’s withdrawal from the universe and upon a radical
sense of alienation from the traditional belief structures that have governed life on
earth’ (ibid., p. 349). His definition of ‘the postmodern condition’ cites Jameson in
passing, omitting reference to the late capitalist structures that produce post-
modernity’s ‘loss of subjectivity’ (ibid., p. 352). While McLeod’s discussions of rave
and Afro-futurism do not entirely omit reference to capitalism, neither do they yield
the insight afforded by more sustained attention to the labour contexts of industrial
and post-industrial capitalism that enable sound system culture’s articulations of
‘technological rationality’ (Gilroy 1987, p. 180).
Some of the questions that McLeod raises by mapping music’s space and alien
images become clearer by focusing on Frankenstein in particular. For instance, John
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Corbett’s analysis of the ‘space madness’ of Lee Perry, Sun Ra, and George Clinton,
which McLeod cites, suggests how each of these artists adopts the Frankenstein-
derived personae of both creator and creature to problematise his diasporic identity
and his relation to the music industry (Corbett 1994, pp. 21–2). ‘In each case, the
boundary between human and machine is blurred, and myths, electronics, defense
weapons, and musical instruments conspire with people to produce the fuzzy image
of the cyborg’ (ibid., p. 19).4
Corbett’s critical triumvirate of Ra, Perry and Clinton informs McLeod’s and
several other accounts of Afro-futurism, like those by Davis, Eshun, and Jonker,
canonising touchstones for techno’s futurism in earlier black Atlantic musics.
Williams points to Detroit native Clinton’s ‘fusion of high-tech rhythm and space age
fantasy’ as an ‘immediate regional influence’ on techno’s originators (Williams 2001,
p. 162). Julian Jonker’s discussion of Afro-futurist artists clarifies their ‘scientific’
disciplines of knowledge that complement the racialised ‘madness’ theorised by
Corbett. Stressing the role of formal experiments in diasporic Afro-futurism (Jonker
2002, ¶31), Jonker notes that science fiction ‘reflects the American racial psyche’ with
‘themes like alienation, colonisation and technology as a disciplinary epistemology’,
and argues that Afro-futurist music occupies a critical ‘interface of science and
aesthetics’ (ibid., ¶19) in which ‘black secret technology is taking white technology
apart and not putting it back together properly’ (ibid., ¶32). The resulting ‘‘‘versions’’
of dub technology’ (e.g. reggae, hip hop, techno, etc.) represent the black Atlantic’s
uprouted ‘double consciousness’ (ibid., ¶44).
Gilroy’s theory of sound system culture’s anti-capitalist critique (Gilroy 1987)
anticipates Jonker’s argument. Jonker quotes Gil Scott Heron on the absurdity of
government space programmes in light of racialised economic disparity (Jonker 2002,
¶1), echoing Gilroy’s treatment of the ‘space flight’ trope in mid-1970s black dance
music (Gilroy 1987, pp. 201–2). For Gilroy, the ‘interplanetary themes in the soul and
funk of this period provided a means to satirise American imperialism and to advance
utopian visions of a reconstructed society’ (ibid., p. 180). Gilroy grounds his theory of
black dance music’s anti-capitalism in its scenes of performance – the sound systems
themselves – as ‘public’ scenes of ‘dialogic’ music-making: ‘dances, clubs, parties and
discos’ (ibid., p. 211) construct community while critiquing both the temporal order of
labour and the commodity form itself (ibid., p. 210). But Gilroy’s attribution of
counter-cultural agency to black Atlantic music appears to extend only as far as hip
hop. Gilroy’s recent arguments (1999, 2000) against the ‘deskilling, dehumanising
technologies’ (Gilroy 1999, p. 267) that produce dance beats as ‘workout music’ (ibid.,
p. 269) identify in this music a symptom of the decay of the black public sphere.
Gilroy’s techno-fetishising image of dance music’s culture industry explicitly echoes
Adorno:
The mechanisation and the militarisation of rhythm are being practised under the sign of
generic dance music. House and its proliferating ‘technocratic’ offshoots culminate in a kind of
imprisonment of rhythm. Rhythm is under house arrest. Frail, feeble, and funky humanity has
been expelled and the sinuous warmth of real-time bass and drums is largely surplus to its
requirements. Surprisingly, the phrase ‘the regression of listening’ springs to mind to make
some sense of this, for ears are no longer tuned in to the possibility of distinguishing the
sampled from the played. (ibid., pp. 269–70)
Numerous problems invite a response: for one, the homogenising caricature of
dance music’s receptions; for another, the inattention to how aura persists in dance
beats, from production, where live improvisation generates samples as often as
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computer-programmed breaks do, to reception, where DJ performances can affirm
the ‘liveness’ of their performance as easily as surrender it. The dispute between UR
and Sony over the unlicensed re-recording of an exclusively synth- and sampler-
produced record instantiates one form of aura’s persistence in scenes structured by
mechanical reproduction. In ‘expelling’ humanity, Gilroy’s ‘technocratic’ image of
dance beats rehearses a Frankensteinian trope of mechanical over-determination that
dismisses the human labour that produces and consumes these musics. Evoking
Adorno’s denigration of jazz, Gilroy’s ‘generic’ characterisation of dance music mis-
recognises the textured hybridity that historically constitutes it and reinforces the
traditional disrespect that music critics reserve for dance genres (as analysed by
McClary 1991, p. 153; Gilbert and Pearson, p. 61).
But as Eshun argues, the Futuristic and surrealistic abandonment of humanist
paradigms and essentialist constructions of black identity – those against which Gilroy
argues – is precisely the point of ‘sonic fictions’ (Eshun 1998, p. -003). Eshun’s reading
of techno’s ‘underground’ ethos drives this point home:
Techno secedes from the street, the street which is widely assumed to be the engine of black
popculture [. . .] In vanishing from the street, and from Trad HipHop’s compulsory logic of
representation and the will to realness, UR [Underground Resistance] identifies not with the
low end but the high end of technology. [. . .] UR [. . .] moves into the Military Industrial
Complex because the MIC precedes and predetermines the street. (ibid., p. 117)
Techno’s problematic relation to ‘the street’ is a Motor City poetics that both fetishises
and resists the music’s mechanical reputation, a reputation mirroring that of Detroit,
where black suburbanites Juan Atkins, Kevin Saunderson and Derrick May pioneered
the sound in the early 1980s. May’s famous homology compared the dance sound to
the city itself as ‘a complete mistake. It’s like George Clinton and Kraftwerk stuck in an
elevator’ (quoted in Sicko 1999, p. 26). This juxtaposition loses its ostensible surprise
in light of how both Clinton and Kraftwerk funked up Frankenstein: the former, as
Dr. Funkenstein; the latter, as robotic synthesizer champions (Reynolds 2000, p. 33).
Juan Atkins collaborated with Rik Davis to form the production duo Cybotron,
which referred to Alvin Toffler’s Third Wave in tracks like ‘Techno City’; references
like these earned the Detroit circle an enduring reputation as exemplars of Toffler’s
‘techno rebels’. Atkins has discussed his music in the Fordist terms adopted earlier by
Motown producer Berry Gordy: ‘‘‘I’m probably more interested in Ford’s robots than
Berry Gordy’s music’’ [. . .] Atkins instinctively homed in on the robots that replaced
humans on the conveyer belts and connected them to the decline of the industrial
model, both economically and musically’ (Williams 2001, p. 161). Creatively abusing
‘trailing-edge’ equipment, techno’s originators produced futuristic-sounding tracks
with ‘lyrics like ‘‘don’t let them robotise your mind’’ . . . [that] testify to an ambivalent
investment in technology’ (Reynolds 1998, pp. 19–20). What better place than Detroit
to foster such ‘ambivalent investment’? The ‘critique of productivism’ (Gilroy 1987,
p. 199) in black Atlantic dance music means, for Detroit’s ‘techno rebels’, a critique of
the shift from Fordism to post-industrialism that made Detroit an early, emblematic
casualty of globalisation (Sicko 1999, pp. 59–60).
Although the word ‘techno’ circulated among producers and their tracks
(Atkins quoted in McCall 2001, p. 30), the term was not used to market a genre until
British record executive Neil Rushton approached the Detroit circle to release the
compilation album Techno! The New Dance Sound of Detroit with Virgin Records in
1988 (Sicko 1999, p. 99). The diasporic subjectivities and intercultural money flows
that nurtured the development of techno have thus condensed in the genre’s name a
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legacy of the multiple ‘futurisms’ of modernity (Campbell 2003): the ‘futuristic’
temporality of science fiction; the Futurist avant-gardes of the early twentieth century;
and ‘futurist’ punditry like that of Toffler and McLuhan before him. The genre’s name
also engages the Utilitarian legacy, not only in its abbreviation of one of that legacy’s
organising figures, but in how the abbreviation as such parodies the efficiency- and
profit-motivated cutbacks that produced Detroit’s post-industrial ‘ruins’. ‘Techno’, or
means, without ‘logy’, or motive, further expresses the Detroit circle’s ambivalence
towards technology, suggesting that another world is possible while furnishing a
driving, regimented soundtrack for ‘the aggressive liberalisation of recent decades’
(Stokes 2000, p. 219).
Like the ‘the irreducible element of mediation in its sound’, techno’s abrogation
of authenticity and its tension between dystopian techno-Luddism and Utopian
techno-fetishism may explain the music’s unpopularity in the US (Williams 2001,
p. 163), where the sound’s wary ambivalence, while ‘a product of our environment’
(Pullen quoted in Williams 2001, p. 161), ironically alienates a domestic audience
accustomed to associating technology with progress and manifest destiny, as Nye
suggests. But these elements may likewise explain techno’s intercultural success in
Europe.
While Toffler, Dr. Funkenstein, Blade Runner and Neuromancer suggest post-
industrial intertexts for techno’s emergence, a telling distinction between the first
domestic and subsequent international ‘waves’ of techno’s development lies in their
sampling practices. Early Detroit techno used samplers to generate abstract sounds
and defamiliarise vocals, but conjured its ‘iconography of the future’ (Gilbert and
Pearson 1999, p. 75) with hardly any explicit samples of supercultural texts. In
contrast, one effect of precisely such explicit sampling by later (especially British)
techno producers has been to popularise the music. The 1988 hit ‘Doctorin’ the Tardis’
by the Timelords (a.k.a. Jimmy Cauty and Bill Drummond, a.k.a. the KLF) sampled
the Daleks, robotic ‘superior beings’ from ‘Doctor Who’. Goldie’s ‘Terminator II’, a
seminal prototype for drum and bass, sampled dialogue from the eponymous film.
The crossover techno act Messiah (a.k.a. Ali Ghani and Mark Davies) opened its 1994
album, 21st Century Jesus, with an apocalyptic announcement of ‘the age of the
machine’ and littered its tracks with Hollywood science fiction samples that amplify
the bombast of their relentless, abrasive breakbeats. Madame Zu (a.k.a. Julia Winters)
was among the first of countless producers to sample The Matrix, with ‘Matrix 999
(The Red Pill)’, which splices dancefloor exhortations with film dialogue: ‘Let let let let
let let let let let let let the bass kick / All I’m offering is the truth’.
‘Wreak havoc on the programmers’
On the domestic front, the production practices of Underground Resistance, one of the
Detroit labels that ‘picked up where May, Atkins, and Saunderson left off in the early
1990s’ (Williams 2001, p. 164), have also adapted Frankenstein, and not simply by
activating their own slogan to ‘wreak havoc on the programmers’ through the media
campaign against Sony in retribution for the purloined ‘Jaguar’ track. The label’s
co-founder, ‘Mad’ Mike Banks, has said: ‘I think Terminator is definitely what’s
happening man – machines have emotions. They can become intelligent and they will
one day’ (quoted in ibid., p. 167). Banks formerly ‘played bass in one of Clinton’s many
spin-off bands, the Brides of Funkenstein’ (ibid., p. 164), and he expresses a visceral
sense of alienation in reflecting on his mixed heritage: ‘I’m not a friendly native no
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more. I’ve been modified into some different shit’ (quoted in Wraight and Nodu 1996,
p. 26). The title of UR’s 1998 Interstellar Fugitives album evokes the ‘fugitive fleet’ of
humanity’s survivors in Battlestar Galactica, while its tracks, with titles like ‘Maroon’
and lyrics that theorise ‘a fundamental technological alteration in [. . .] what it means
to be human’ (Williams 2001, p. 169), evoke the displacement and subjugation that
define black American history.
Eshun also illuminates some of UR’s other Frankenstein adaptations: Robert
Hood as ‘The Vision’ (Marvel Comics’ ‘anguished android’ [p. 118]); the Death Star EP;
and UR’s ‘monstrous’ mantra: ‘Wreak havoc on the programmers!’ (quoted in Eshun
1998, p. 122). Furthermore, he traces a line of influence from the identifications of
Clinton, Perry, and Ra with both creature and creator to the similar identifications of
techno producers with both the manufactured robot figure and the manufacturing
sound engineer: ‘in the films Predator 2, Ghost in the Shell, the Alien tetralogy, it’s
always the engineers who are ready to turn the alien into killer app’ (ibid., p. 111).5
Likewise, Williams claims that UR’s combination of ‘localised self-sufficiency’ and
mysticism ‘would result in a new form of racial subjectivity’ (ibid., p. 164): ‘the body
that this music creates is [. . .] redefined by [cyborg] technology’ (ibid., p. 167).
After Atkins, May, and Saunderson became internationally famous as touring
DJs (Reynolds 1998, p. 219), UR became a leading exemplar of techno’s domestic
‘second wave’ of younger producers who inherited the local scene. In its productions
and business practices, UR amplifies techno’s Futurist militarism, while inscribing its
authenticity through the ‘hard city’ imagery of post-industrial Detroit.
‘For several months before they released anything, Jeff Mills and Mike Banks
(a.k.a. Mad Mike) planned and theorised their operation’ (ibid., p. 219). The trenchant
independence for which UR became, according to one fan, ‘the most revered techno
imprint in the world’ (‘Label profile’) materialises in the label’s records and in its
networked (if not exactly vertical) business integrations, to maintain critical distance
from a mainstream music industry that UR describes as ‘the programmers’. UR’s
signal innovation in vinyl form is the ‘locked’ groove, circular instead of spiral,
developed by veteran Detroit record-cutter Ron Murphy in collaboration with Mills
on UR’s ‘Rings of Saturn’ EP (Sicko 1999, p. 158); the improvised use of locked grooves
by techno DJs has since become a sign of virtuosity. In its business model, UR restricts
use of its ‘Black Planet’ studio to its own signed artists, ‘ke[eps] interviews to a
minimum and let[s] its products do the talking’ (ibid., p. 145), preferring online and
fax communiqués to mass media exposure (‘About Underground Resistance’), and
retains firm control over its creative direction. Determined to control as many means
of production as possible, Banks teamed up with Christa Weatherspoon Robinson in
1992 to establish Submerge to centralise administration for local dance music labels.
Submerge manufactures the recordings and merchandise for UR and some dozen
affiliated labels, and distributes these products as wholesaler and retailer, in addition
to promoting and publishing its labels’ products. While Submerge’s publishing
division handles licensing for UR and other Submerge labels, there appears to be
disagreement over whether and how UR entertains product licensing by other labels
and companies.
Sicko suggests some licensing activity on UR’s part (ibid., p. 145), but its
extent remains unclear, given Sicko’s subsequent claim that ‘the closest UR came to
signing with any label was its agreement to contribute the song ‘Elimination’ to
Mute’s 1991 compilation Paroxysm’ (ibid., p. 146). The popularity of ‘Jaguar’ and the
Sony controversy have dated Sicko’s claim for UR’s licensing reservations. While
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Banks says that the label refused dozens of licensing requests before its conflict with
Sony (quoted in DJ MG 2000, ¶5), the success of ‘Jaguar’ has since motivated UR to
license this track to numerous clients, including the UK division of Detroit label 430
West (‘430 West’; Askew) and several DJ mix CDs (e.g. Jon Carter’s 7 Live #1; MTV
Extreme; Pete Tong’s Essential Mix 2000).
Ten years after Derrick May’s ‘Strings of Life’ defined techno for dancefloors
across Europe (Reynolds 1998, p. 219), Rolando Rocha’s ‘Jaguar’ refined that sound
for dancefloors around the world. One Detroit Techno list member suggested that
‘Jaguar’’s popularity derived from its formal similarities to ‘Strings’, particularly the
elaborate synth-strings sequencing (Watkins). That performances of renowned DJs
like Masters at Work, Ken Ishii, and Atkins have mixed these two tracks together
in their playlists supports this formal connection (cf. A-Zed; Clark; Sokolowski).
Released in March 1999, ‘Jaguar’ had become a club anthem – and UR’s most popular
release to date – by the year’s end, when Sony Music’s Frankfurt-based dance division
began circulating a ‘promo release’ of a cover version of Rocha’s track (Dreyer quoted
in ‘Sony Informs UR’ 1999). The ‘promotional’ rhetoric in Sony A&R manager Dirk
Dreyer’s communications with UR suggests limited circulation to record pools or
specialty shops, and seems intended to reassure the label that Sony wasn’t a competi-
tive threat. We will return to the implications of ‘promotional’ expenditure for
intellectual property law in cultural production after tracing the main points in the
case.
The case of the purloined ‘Jaguar’
While it is a testament to the enduring devotion of UR’s ‘underground’ following
that the subsequent account has been reconstructed through abundant documents
archived online, we must note the methodological problems that arise in essaying
anything like an authoritative account on the basis of such evidence. The archive
mined here is compromised, mediated by numerous gatekeepers, and representative
of the tension between representation and the real, fiction and history – the tension
‘between perpetration and recollection’ that Jacques Derrida calls ‘the logic of the
hymen . . . the consummation of differends’ (Derrida 1981, p. 212). Simply put, the
veracity of dates, names and events represented in the messages, journalism and
commentary that comprise this archive remains unverifiable. That said, the online
archive itself represents a durable effect of UR’s campaign, and warrants our attention
as such.
One striking fact in the case of UR versus Sony and BMG is the absence of a legal
case. In an 8 December 1999 email, Banks reiterated UR’s refusal to license the track,
claimed Sony had not sought licensing permission, and outlined UR’s strategy:
Unless Sony Music gives UR an open apology in all major press we will have no choice but
to defend ourselves and not only ourselves but the whole of underground music! I intend
on showing them that these wars will not be fought in the unfair conditions of their court-
rooms where their corporate lawyers have an advantage! these wars will be fought in the new
arena – out here in deep space where the playing field is more level. (quoted in DJ MG 2000, ¶6)
The compelling aspect of Banks’ plan is his refusal to take the case to court, perceiving
in the legal institution only service to corporate interests. In his coverage of the
controversy, DJ MG speculates that Banks’ rationale harbours a bottom-line anxiety:
‘It is highly doubtful if a small record label like UR could survive a lawsuit against
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powerhouses like Sony and BMG [. . .] companies who have just filed a lawsuit against
the Web site MP3.com for copyright infringement’. Despite later intimations that
UR was considering pursuit of ‘legal proceedings’ (Harris 2000, ‘Re: (313) Jaguar’),
the label seems to have abandoned that pursuit. Not that UR didn’t fight the law, as
the song goes. Banks’ refusal to close ranks on the officially recognised field of legal
battle constitutes a different kind of fighting the law: a challenge to its legitimacy, a
critical recognition of ‘the law of the law’ (Derrida 1992, p. 191), of its history as an
institution to enforce ruling-class security. UR’s tactic also implies the recognition of
copyright law’s ‘abandonment of the author-subject for the corporate rights-holder’
(Schumacher 1995, p. 270 n. 11) – albeit paradoxically, given UR’s own corporate
status.
Sony’s ‘promo release’ of its ‘Jaguar’ cover version reached the US market in
December 1999 (PW). On 9 December, UR representative Cornelius Harris emailed
the Detroit Techno (or ‘313’6) mailing list, advising members to boycott the release,
providing contact information for Dreyer, Sony Germany, Sony US, and Sony
Canada, and inviting members to ‘flood Sony’s offices worldwide with calls, emails,
and faxes’ of protest. ‘Cover versions traditionally have been done by fans of the
original track as an homage to the original’, Harris wrote. ‘In this case, it is being done
as a method of undercutting the sales of the original’ (‘Underground Resistance’).
On 10 December, Dreyer emailed UR to justify the cover version, which he
described as ‘the talk of the techno community’ (quoted in ‘Sony Informs’ 1999).
Stating that a prior request made by Sony to license ‘Jaguar’ had met with no response,
Dreyer wrote
In my way of ‘industry thinking’ it is a track worth to be available for lot of people, much more
than just people going to vinyl shops. [. . .] As we don’t want to be seen as guys who rip off or
bootleg a well known track, we have chosen the way of rerecording the track tone by tone. [. . .]
On the CD will be the original writer and publishing credits that you get the publishing money
you deserve. (ibid.)
This quotation’s appeal to Detroit ‘originality’ evinces the aforementioned persistence
of aura, and clarifies that the ensuing dispute concerned not uncleared sampling, nor
piracy, but an unlicensed replication of UR’s record – and, more generally, the
appropriation of UR’s ‘subcultural capital’ (as theorised by Thornton 1996, p. 11).
However, Dreyer’s correspondence with UR was forwarded to the 313 mailing
list – and reprinted at Submerge’s website (Harris, ‘Sony Response’) – thus keeping
UR’s fans apprised of the developing situation. Mailing list members began respond-
ing in droves, to both the list and Sony: many to criticise the ‘rip off’; some, on behalf
of record stores determined not to carry the cover (SqrRt); and one or two to register
scepticism of the conflict’s veracity. On 11 December, DJ and producer Terrence
Parker weighed in to clarify the legal issues at stake, rejecting Dreyer’s claim that Sony
could satisfy copyright law merely by printing the appropriate credits on the product:
Sony still has to FIRST get permission in the form of a COMPULSORY LICENCE or SAMPLE
CLEARANCE (depending upon the content of this new version which I still have yet to hear)
from UR (MIKE & ROLANDO) before they can LAWFULLY exploit their version of ‘JAGUAR’.
All of this depends on what Mike and Rolando feel about the content of this ‘new version’.
(‘SONY vs UR’)
On 17 December, Dreyer declared that ‘Sony Music will not commercially release the
track’ but hinted ‘that a different company will use the idea’ (quoted in ‘Sony Recalls
Fake Jaguar’ 1999). In reply, Harris summarised UR’s ‘feeling’ about the ‘new version’
by recalling Dreyer’s own denigration of it, and by objecting to the sleeve art’s image
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of a pill, which conjured a drug culture from which Detroit purists had been trying to
distance their music since the heyday of hardcore rave in the early 1990s (Sicko 1999,
p. 133): ‘From the drug references to the lack of musicianship displayed, you have
done damage to UR’s reputation as a label and a group dedicated to raising the
standards of not only techno, but electronic dance music in general’ (Underground
Fighters 1999). Harris went on to doubt Dreyer’s declaration of desistance, and to
criticise the rep’s attempts to patronise and placate UR (by suggesting that ‘at least the
UR record will benefit from the story’): ‘You claim to understand why UR does not
deal with majors, yet you seem to go out of your way to validate our concerns’ (ibid.).
Having, in his words, ‘received a lot of feedback from the underground’ over the
previous week (quoted in ‘Sony Recalls’), Dreyer emailed a brief apology and a
reiteration of Sony’s halt on its version on 20 December (‘Sony’s Deception’). The
313 mailing list continued to buzz with questions, suggestions and speculations, but
the case seemed more or less closed – until 10 January 2000, when Harris sent an
update: Dreyer had informed him not only that the producers who composed the
note-for-note cover version had signed it to BMG, but also that the unauthorised track
was ranking among the top ten on German dance charts (‘UR vs BMG/Ariola’), and a
video was airing on Germany’s VIVA music channel (DJ MG 2000, ¶22).
Harris’ subsequent efforts over the course of the month to contact the respon-
sible parties at BMG appear to have been unsuccessful. On 27 January, he was
forwarded a brief message from BMG’s Clive Rich, who advised him only to contact
BMG Ariola Muenchen’s lawyer (‘Harris Contacted’ 2000); three days later, he con-
versed with BMG’s Clemon Williams, ‘and he basically had the position of ‘‘we don’t
know what the hell is going on’’’ (Harris quoted in ‘Harris & BMG’s’ 2000). A reporter
who had first put Harris in touch with Rich observed: ‘all systems are go at BMG [. . .]
it seems they have attempted to create a complex chain in order to hide any wrong
doing on their part’ (quoted in ‘Wirestation Reporter’ 2000). BMG’s complex manage-
ment structures appeared to afford the company strategic deniability, and the ability
to defer UR’s demands for resolution ad infinitum.
Nevertheless, by early February, BMG’s Inge Schneider had contacted UR with
a letter purporting to explain the German company’s claim to a legal ‘third party
licensing agreement’ according to German and US royalty collection protocols:
The original publisher of ‘Jaguar’ Mad Max Music is a member of Harry Fox Agency and
therefore subject to aforementioned compulsory licence [sic]. Financially this regulation is no
disadvantage for the involved US publishers and authors: The mechanical royalties paid by
BMG to GEMA are forwarded to Harry Fox Agency and from there to the original publisher and
the authors. (quoted in DJ MG 2000, ¶28)
Banks refuted Schneider’s claim. According to a message forwarded to the Detroit
Techno list on Banks’ behalf, UR’s track wasn’t at that time in Harry Fox’s repertoire
of properties subject to licensing (Drada 2000). UR also claimed never to have received
any royalties that such an agreement would stipulate, and that a chart-climbing cover
version would presumably generate (DJ MG 2000, ¶30).
DJ MG concludes his online account of events with word from Harris ‘that BMG
is discreetly pulling the copies of their ‘‘Jaguar’’ from the stores’. This account itself
represents one of the diverse tactics with which UR carried out its campaign against
Sony and BMG. By 4 February 2000, David Bate published a more comprehensive
online archive of primary documents in the case (which, somewhat remarkably,
remains available at the time of writing). Bate began archiving these materials because
he felt that the controversy received insufficient media attention, naming only niche
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magazines like XLR8R, Urb, Muzik and DJ Mag as organs taking an interest in the story
(Bate 2000, ‘WEB ARTICLES’).
Other tactics that UR and its supporters brought to the label’s fight with the
majors included an online petition, and UR’s exhortations to ‘flood’ Sony and BMG
with protest messages; the online archive also includes anecdotal evidence of more
direct-action approaches. In March 2000, a debate among Detroit Techno list members
arose over what to do when encountering copies of the BMG release in record shops.
One list member, upon failing to persuade a shop manager in Las Vegas to take the
cover off the shelves, claimed to have hidden them ‘at the back of the store’, wishing
in hindsight that ‘i had had tha money with me to buy all of tha records they had’, to
prevent others from buying it (‘more injustices’). This last reflection prompted con-
demnation for its bottom-line support of the offenders, from a list member who
suggested instead that shoppers scratch up copies of the record when finding it in a
store (de Yonker). Another member admitted to such vandalism: ‘i broke the needle
while putting 12’’ scratches on the last copy at some crappy store in toronto’ (Goode).
The dubious veracity of such anecdotes aside, their emergence in cities across
North America attests to the effectiveness of UR’s publicity in leveraging the ‘brand
loyalty’ of its ‘underground’ supporters. While the question of whether UR ever
initiated legal action against BMG remains unanswered, the label launched yet
another tactic. Dreyer seems correct in at least one point that gives us pause to wonder
whether the whole débacle wasn’t actually hatched as ‘anti-marketing marketing’ (a
ploy that Sicko rejects on UR’s behalf [Sicko 1999, p. 147]): the original ‘Jaguar’ seems
to have benefited enormously from the dispute. In a few months in 1999, ‘Jaguar’ had
moved from heavy rotation by Detroit techno’s top DJs to ubiquitous rotation among
representative DJs in various dance genres around the world. By February 2000, the
controversy fuelled the track’s appeal for Detroit ambassadors like Derrick May,
John Acquaviva, and Jeff Mills, as well as other ‘star’ DJs, who found in Rocha’s track
a wordless yet evocative statement of techno’s claims on independence and
authenticity.
UR moved quickly to capitalise on the track’s metonymy as resistance to
corporate culture control. On 14 February, Banks circulated an open letter to the
‘Global Underground Electronic Music Community’. Banks’ message is worth quot-
ing at length, for its ‘politics of transfiguration’ (Gilroy 1993, p. 37), its sampling of
Dreyer’s words to conjure the spectre of America’s slave economy, its eminently
prophetic denunciation of ‘false prophets’, its Frankensteinian reference to ‘the
matrix’, and its ‘anti-marketing’ savvy:
UR would like to acknowledge the swarm of digital killer bees that is emerging from the
shadows to protect and defend the hive.
Unfortunately at this particular space in time, the beginning of their new millennium, the year
2000, when music the lifeform of sound is looking forward to a future filled with intelligence,
tolerance and respect it has to instead look into the now of reality and find itself struggling,
surrounded by greed, false prophets, lies, deception and treachery, the old familiar tools of the
programmers that have destroyed civilisations, cultures and environments over the centuries.
Some of you stand by and watch as they slowly put their fingers around the neck of the music
you love! What chance will music have when an ‘industry way of thinking’ allowed human life
to be sold on an auction block. [. . .]
This is an opportunity for you to analyse the matrix you live in.
As we do battle for the soul of the sound we ask the spirit of the Jaguar and our ancestors to keep
giving us the power, strength and guidance to defeat the programmers.
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For those who know, stay low, stay strong, stay ready, stay underground. For those who don’t,
learn. For those who ‘Stole the Soul’, live in fear as the spirits will track you into your next
lifetimes and beyond. Nothing good will come to you. And for those who don’t believe in spirit,
then what is it exactly that these note for note covers are lacking?
Consider hostilities at ‘Condition Red’ the Jaguar will have its revenge!!! (quoted in Marsel
2000)
As with most of Banks’ missives, a third party brokered it (establishing the authen-
ticity of Banks’ statements seems as difficult as doing so for tapes claiming to issue
from Osama bin Laden). This statement exemplifies Banks’ refusal of ‘the modern,
occidental separation of ethics and aesthetics, culture and politics’ (Gilroy 1987,
pp. 38–9), a refusal that characterises the ‘modernist politics’ (Gilbert and Pearson
1999, p. 75) of ‘underground’ ideology (Thornton 1996, p. 145). But what Banks’
cryptic prophecy amounts to is a press release hyping UR’s Revenge of the Jaguar remix
EP, review copies of which had already begun to attract niche media attention.
If BMG was determined to keep its unauthorised knock-off on the market, UR
determined to beat this bully on its own turf. With three remixes by some of Detroit’s
most famous producers (e.g. UR alumnus Mills), as well as two locked grooves, the
vinyl release targeted the DJ’s DJ. To render UR’s releases more affordable in the
European market, UR’s affiliate label 430 West assumed UK-based distribution of
the remixes and re-pressed the original ‘Jaguar’ (previously available only as an
import). 430 West released the remix single on 11 September 2000 (‘Resistance’ 2000,
¶4); it soon achieved rotation on BBC Radio One, with a video on MTV UK (Osselaer
2000, ¶31). Rocha himself entered the promotional fray with an aggressive tour of
European night club duty.
In short, UR flooded the market that Sony and BMG had tried to exploit, with
productions that publicised the controversy which had occasioned them, while
reasserting the ‘authentic’ Detroit sound. UR’s saturation of the European dance
music market with ‘Jaguar’ CD editions and remixes helped the label to flourish far
beyond Detroit, through definitively transnational corporate manoeuvres. The very
abundance of online archival documents constitutes a testament to the effectiveness of
UR’s publicity and releases.
Promotion and presumption
The economics of ‘promotional’ dance records further elucidate the issues at stake in
UR’s tangle with the majors. The vinyl singles available for purchase in DJ specialty
shops range from major label releases to ‘promotional’ or ‘white-label’ pressings. The
latter are often unmarked, with blank labels, or with only scant notation: the name or
acronym of a label (e.g. Eric B. and Rakim), an e-mail address (e.g. Wink), the artist’s
name in ballpoint (e.g. Freeland), etc. Among such cryptic notations, phrases like
‘Promo’ (e.g. Blame), ‘Promotional Record Not For Re-Sale’ (e.g. Dillinja et al.), or ‘DJ
only test press’ (e.g. SFB) act both as legal disclaimers and as advertisements that
signal a product’s rarity or ‘bootleg’ status. Similar phrases can appear on major-label
releases, but carry quite a different tone: ‘Promotional copy [. . .] Property of BMG
Music Canada. Not for sale or rental. [. . .] If you paid for this product call [. . .]’
(Tamperer).
The discourse of ‘DJ promotional use’, combined with the relative anonymity,
high volume and rapid turnover of dance record production, represents a loophole
Techno, Frankenstein and copyright 275
whereby producers can mass-produce a record (although most pressings don’t run
over a few hundred), ostensibly for promotional expenditure, although record shops
regularly make them available for retail sale. This discourse assumes different mean-
ings when offered by an independent producer, on the one hand, and a transnational
corporation, on the other. Nevertheless, the tracks issued by these parties – despite
their vastly different power relations in the music industry – harbour the mutually
promotional effect noted by Dreyer. The increased circulation of ‘Jaguar’ following its
controversy substantiates this effect, which, as Norman Stolzoff writes, is a virtual
institution in the copyright-bucking Jamaican dancehall scene: ‘being pirated can
actually benefit a young artist’s career’. Unauthorised reproduction can thus accrue
subcultural capital; as Stolzoff’s interviewee, dancehall artist Blacka P, puts it, ‘You
mus’ get rob’ (Stolzoff 2000, p. 177).
As a label that started literally underground, in the basement of Banks’ family
home (Oldham 2000, ¶13), UR mythologises its Detroit roots, while profiting from
sales largely external to the city. UR’s strident commitment to Detroit and to a core
clientele of techno ‘purists’ seems to disavow the corporate economics that structure
its own ‘rational organisation of the productive processes’ (Gilroy 1987, p. 37) – and its
vociferous defence of intellectual property. So what does ‘independence’ mean in
this globalising context? Among the several theories of record label ‘independence’
surveyed by Keith Negus (1996), David Hesmondhalgh’s might typify UR:
Not all small companies are simply small entrepreneurs, argues Hesmondhalgh. Some are
attempting to create genuine alternatives. But they are faced with a situation whereby if they
want to communicate their music to a wider audience then they have to do this through the
capitalist system. (ibid., p. 44)
The material alternative championed by UR is a community-building small-business
model, informed by a militant anti-racist philosophy. But as a canonical institution in
the dance music niche market, UR also adheres to an ‘indie label’ ideology, developed
by Stephen Lee (1992), and elaborated by Keith Negus as follows:
the notion of ‘independence’ works as a belief system that defines different working practices
and values to that [sic] of the majors, while at the same time providing a way of positioning a
small company within an ‘alternative’ niche market – the latter seemingly contradicting the
former. [. . .] so-called independent companies are not only firmly within the system (rather
than outside of it) but [. . .] their ‘ideology’ of independence deludes them into believing that
this is not the case or avoidable. (Negus 1996, p. 45)
While I would hardly characterise UR as ‘deluded’, I would suggest their success
depends as much on their imaginative, Frankensteinian discourse of ‘resistance’ as it
does on their actual products. The case of ‘Jaguar’ demonstrates on UR’s behalf a
somewhat contradictory, simultaneous reliance on copyright law as ethical principle
and a rejection of the legal establishment. For UR, independence means independence
from Adorno and Horkheimer’s culture industry, and independence from the insti-
tutionalised terrors of racism, but never from capitalism as such. Instead, the label
targets specific conditions of late capitalism such as institutional oligarchy, cultural
homogenisation, and the corporate restriction of free expression.
Ironically, in the case of UR’s copyright skirmish with Sony, Frankenstein
appears both as a figure with which Underground Resistance identifies, in its mantra
to ‘wreak havoc on the programmers’, and as one identified by the label in the
corporate character of its adversaries. In Banks’ above-quoted missive to ‘the swarm
of digital killer bees’, his image of corporate domination over the music industry is not
merely an image of murder, but of strangulation: ‘some of you stand by and watch as
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they slowly put their fingers around the neck of the music you love!’ The privation of
both voice and life, strangulation is also the preferred method of Frankenstein’s
monster: ‘I have murdered the innocent as they slept, and grasped to death his throat
who never injured me’ (Shelley 1992, pp. 213–4). The case also renders ironic the
majors’ complaints against file-sharing technology, and dramatises ‘the endurance of
Frankenstein’ as a durable trope through which popular cultural producers and
consumers imagine, deploy, and trouble technologies of cultural reproduction. But
if UR’s encounter with the ‘presumption’ of the major labels reveals some of
the conservative, capitalist complicities of music industry independence that are
occulted by the ideology of ‘underground’ independence, this encounter remains an
instructive demonstration of how creative and tactical combinations of new and
established media can problematise and transform culture against the domination of
its production by transnational corporations impelled less by creativity and diversity
in expression than by maximising shareholder value.
Endnotes
1. Bernd Herzogenrath (2000) notes that The
Prodigy’s name combines meanings of off-
spring and monstrosity (¶7), like those com-
bined in Shelley’s ‘hideous progeny’ (Shelley
1992, p. 10).
2. The Death Star as a figure of nuclear warfare
illustrates Kathleen Sullivan’s (1999) argument
that ‘the monsters of the nuclear age [are] typi-
fied by Shelley’s monster’ (quoted in Morton
2002, p. 56).
3. The premise of Glen A. Larson’s original series
attributed the creation of the Cylons to ‘a race of
reptiles’ (Communists?); in a suggestive rewrit-
ing closer to Shelley’s text, the 2003 remake
of the series attributes responsibility for the Cy-
lons directly to human agency.
4. Complementing Corbett’s reading of doubled
Frankensteinian figures in the realm of pro-
duction, Reynolds (1999) uses such figures to
describe ‘the fetishism of science’ in dance
music’s reception: ‘Rave became a gigantic psy-
chosocial experiment, with millions of kids
modifying their own neurochemistry. [. . .] In
rave, kids play the role of both Frankenstein
and the monster, experimenting on their own
nervous systems’ (ibid., pp. 203–4).
5. ‘Killer app’ is a computing colloquialism, mean-
ing a good or excellent program (‘app’ being
short for ‘application’); here Eshun puns on
the double entendre of ‘killer’ as an adjective
connoting both ‘cool’ and ‘deadly’.
6. 313 is Detroit’s telephone area code.
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